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Unnecessary Suffering, The Red Cross
and Tactical Laser Weapons
BURRUS M. CARNAHAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
[B]linding as a method of warfare is a superfluous injury and a
cause of unnecessary suffering, both of which are prohibited
under existing international humanitarian law.'
In May 1995, as part of its campaign efforts, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)2 emphatically agreed with
this general assessment of blinding laser weapons.3 This action
was a striking policy departure for the ICRC. For the first time in
its history, the ICRC publicly denounced a specific method of
warfare as a violation of international law.4
* Senior Analyst, Science Applications International Corporation; Lieutenant
Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Ret.); International Law Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force
1979-1982; Member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Conference on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 1979-1980. LL.M. in International
Law, University of Michigan; J.D., Northwestern University. In the International Law
Division of the U.S. Air Force Headquarters, this author reviewed the legality of weapons
under international law.
1. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, BLINDING WEAPONS 7 (1995) [hereinafter ICRC
BLINDING WEAPONS].
2. The ICRC founded the Red Cross movement in Geneva, Switzerland in the 1860s,
to care for sick and wounded soldiers during wars. It is international in scope only in
humanitarian activities. The ICRC is a Swiss nonprofit corporation whose governing body
has always been composed entirely of Swiss citizens. The Swiss government provides the
majority of its budget. The ICRC should not be confused with other elements of the Red
Cross movement that cooperate with the ICRC but are independent of it, such as the
National Red Cross Societies that exist in most countries (including Switzerland), the
International Conference of the Red Cross,.and the League of Red Cross Societies. See
DAVID FORSYTHE, HUMANITARIAN POLITICS 6-24 (1977).
3. ICRC BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 1, at 7.
4. The closest parallel occurred over seventy-five years earlier, when the ICRC,
almost three years after the first use of poison gas in World War I, protested "with all the
forces at [its] command against such warfare, which can only be called criminal." The basis
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Because the ICRC possesses a unique status in public interna-
tional law, its departure from precedent is more than a mere
change in policy by an old and prestigious human rights organiza-
tion. The 1949 Geneva Conventions (Geneva Conventions) 5 give
the ICRC a distinct role in protecting prisoners of war, civilians
and other victims of armed conflict, even though it has no
international legal personality and is merely a private organization
of Swiss citizens. Generally, the Geneva Conventions recognize the
legitimacy of "humanitarian activities which the [ICRC] ... may,
subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned,
undertake for the protection . . . [of war victims]."6  Several
of this appeal was ambiguous and may have expressed a moral rather than a legal position.
Jean Mirimanoff-Chilikine, The Red Cross and Biological and Chemical Weapons, in A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 356, 357 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved
Nanda eds., 1973) (quoting ICRC Appeal of Feb. 6, 1918). The ICRC has occasionally
proposed new restrictions on weapons de lege ferenda, on the basis of entirely new law. In
1920, for example, it advocated a ban- on asphyxiating gases in a letter to the League of
Nations Assembly. Id. In 1956, it proposed a ban on delayed action munitions and "wea-
pons whose harmful effects, which resulted in particular from the dissemination of
incendiary, chemical, bacteriological, radioactive or other agents, could spread to an
unforeseen degree or escape ... from the control of those who employ them .... " Draft
Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of
War, art. 14, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 187, 191 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 2d ed. 1981). Because of their potential impact on nuclear weapons, the ICRC
Draft Rules received no more than perfunctory attention. See FORSYTHE, supra note 2,
at 118-19.
In the early 1970s, the ICRC was again active in sponsoring expert meetings at
Lugano and Lucerne to discuss new restrictions on specific weapons. In the end, however,
the ICRC decided not to support new restrictions on any particular weapon, in order to
maintain its political neutrality. See Frits Kalshoven, Conventional Weaponry: The Law
from St. Petersburg to Lucerne and Beyond, in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW 251,
254-62 (Michael Meyer ed., 1989).
5. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Convention on Armed Forces]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention on Armed Forces at'Sea];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Convention of Prisoners of War]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War [hereinafter Convention on
Civilians], Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
6. Convention on Armed Forces, supra note 5, art. 9, 6 U.S.T. at 3120, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 36; Convention on Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 5, art. 9, 6 U.S.T. at 3222, 75
U.N.T.S. at 90; Convention on Prisoners of War, supra note 5, art. 9, 6 U.S.T. at 3323, 75
U.N.T.S. at 142, 144; Convention on Civilians, supra note 5, art. 10, 6 U.S.T. at 3528, 75
U.N.T.S. at 294. The Geneva Conventions contain specific provisions regarding access by
prisoners of war and civilians to the ICRC and the ICRC's access to camps and other areas
where such persons work or are detained. See Convention on Prisoners of War, supra note
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provisions recognize the ICRC's traditional role in providing relief
shipments to prisoners of war, civilian internees and inhabitants of
occupied territories. 7  In particular, the Geneva Conventions
mandate signatory parties to recognize and respect "at all times
[the] special position of the [ICRC] in this field."8
Disputes over the lawfulness of weapons and methods of
warfare are not likely to affect the ICRC's ability to carry out these
functions. The ICRC's role in monitoring criminal trials of prison-
ers of war, however, may be impaired. Under the Convention on
Prisoners of War, the Protecting Power, a neutral state that
protects prisoners of war, should supervise such trials,9 including
trials for violations of war crimes.'° Unfortunately, Protecting
Powers have rarely been allowed to exercise such functions in
armed conflicts since the end of World War II. As a result, the
ICRC has often assumed the responsibility of a Protecting Power,
both formally and informally."
Trials of prisoners of war are subject to international supervi-
sion to ensure protection of the defendant's rights under the
Geneva Conventions. Perhaps the most fundamental of these
rights is that "[n]o prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for
an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or
by International Law, in force at the time the said act was commit-
5, arts. 79, 81, 126, 6 U.S.T. at 3378, 3381, 3383, 3418, 3420, 75 U.N.T.S. at 196, 198, 200,
234, 236; Convention on Civilians, supra note 5, arts. 30, 143, 6 U.S.T. at 3537, 3613, 3617,
75 U.N.T.S. at 308, 384, 386. The ICRC may also use its offices to seek agreement on
safety zones for the sick and wounded, the aged, children under fifteen, expectant mothers
and mothers of children under seven. See Convention on Armed Forces, supra note 5, art.
23, 6 U.S.T. at 3130, 75 U.N.T.S. at 46; Conventions on Civilians, supra note 5, art. 14, 6
U.S.T. at 3527, 75 U.N.T.S. at 298.
7. See Convention on Prisoners of War, supra note 5, arts. 72-73, 75, 6 U.S.T. at 3371,
3374, 3376, 75 U.N.T.S. at 190, 192, 194; Convention on Civilians, supra note 5, arts. 61,
108, 6 U.S.T. at 3555, 3591, 75 U.N.T.S. at 326, 360.
8. Convention on Civilians, supra note 5, U.S.T. at 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. at 287.
9. See Convention on Prisoners of War, supra note 5, arts. 8, 100-101, 104-105, 107,
6 U.S.T. at 3324, 3385, 3393, 3397, 3399, 75 U.N.T.S. at 142, 210, 212, 214, 216.
10. War crimes are violations of the different laws and customs of war. Id.
11. See FORSYTHE, supra note 2, at 116. The third paragraph of Article 10 of the
Convention on Prisoners of War provides that if the belligerent powers cannot agree on
a neutral state as Protecting Power, "the Detaining Power shall request or shall
accept ... the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization, such as the Internation-
al Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed by
Protecting Powers under the present Convention." Convention on Prisoners of War, supra
note 5, art. 10, 6 U.S.T. at 3327, 75 U.N.T.S. at 144.
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ted." 2  If a prisoner of war is accused of using "blinding as a
method of warfare," the ICRC will now apparently accept that
charge as stating an offense under international law, regardless of
the position of the prisoner's own government on the legality of
blinding lasers.
Unfortunately, the ICRC chose a poor issue on which to break
precedent. This Article asserts that the ICRC is wrong as a matter
of law and that blinding as a method of warfare, particularly with
a laser weapon, does not violate existing international law norms.
In Part II, this Article discusses the ICRC's stand regarding
blinding laser weapons. Parts III and IV detail the international
principle of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering and
analyze the principle's application to various military weapons. In
Part V, this Article applies the principle of superfluous injury and
unnecessary suffering to tactical laser weapons. Finally, this Article
concludes that blinding laser weapons and their use in military
combat do not violate international law.
II. THE ICRC's POSITION ON "BLINDING AS A METHOD OF
WARFARE"
Any effort to analyze the ICRC's position must determine
precisely what the ICRC believes is prohibited under existing
international humanitarian law. The ICRC campaign brochure,
quoted at the beginning of this Article, is vague on the question of
exactly what constitutes "blinding as a method of warfare." The
campaign paraphernalia twice refers favorably to a pending
proposal to ban "intentional laser blinding,"13 but makes no other
12. Convention on Prisoners of War, supra note 5, art. 99, 6 U.S.T. at 3393, 75
U.N.T.S. at 210.
13. See ICRC BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 1, at 8. This proposal would have
added a protocol on blinding laser weapons to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature, Apr. 10, 1981,
19 I.L.M. 1524 [hereinafter CCW]. The CCW was opened for signature with three annexed
protocols. Upon ratification or accession, a party was required to agree to be bound by
at least two protocols. Id. art. 4, para. 3, at 1525. Protocol I prohibits weapons that use
fragments not detectable by X-ray. Id. Protocol I, at 1529. Protocol II regulates land
mines and booby-traps. Id. Protocol II, at 1529. Protocol III deals with incendiary
weapons. Id. Protocol III, at 1534.
On October 12, 1995, a consensus of the 44 participants in the CCW Review
Conference adopted Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons. Additional Protocol to the
Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
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mention of the need for an intent to blind.
Elsewhere, the brochure implies that unintentional blinding
with a combat laser may also constitute "blinding as a method of
warfare." Campaign propaganda notes the development of
"[lasers which are usable against both personnel and against
certain sensors"14 and ominously states that "[t]hose [lasers] which
are easily portable are more likely to be used as anti-personnel
weapons."' 5  The brochure devotes almost a full page to the
development of portable, battery-powered lasers and "laser ri-
fles.",16  Although the ICRC acknowledges in passing that lasers
have a variety of military uses, including range-finding and marking
targets for precision guided munitions, 7 the impression that
portable combat lasers are inherently sinister markedly shines
through. One sub-heading, for example, labels such weapons as "a
terrorist's tool."' 8 Thus, any soldier captured in possession of a
portable combat laser should be regarded with suspicion.
The ICRC would be skeptical of any claim that a soldier
captured with a laser weapon merely intended to temporarily
impair enemy vision by "flash-blinding" or "dazzling" with a laser.
In the discussion of portable lasers, the brochure states that at a
range of one kilometer, "[a]nyone whose eyes are hit by the beam
would be blinded, in most cases permanently."' 9  Even more
significant is the following statement: "Although 'flash blinding' or
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), CCW/CONF.1/7 (Oct. 12, 1995)
[hereinafter Protocol IV]. Under article 1 of Protocol IV, "[i]t is prohibited to employ laser
weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat
functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or
to the eye with corrective eyesight devices." Id. art. 1. Under Article 5 of the CCW, the
protocol will enter into force six months after twenty CCW parties notify the U.N. Secre-
tary General of their consent to be bound by it. CCW, supra, art.5, para. 3, at 1526.
14. ICRC BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 1, at 2.
15. See ICRC BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 1, at 3.
16. Id.
17. On the military uses of lasers, see Mark Hewish, Battlefield Lasers, INT'L DEF.
REV., Feb. 1995, at 39. By allowing more accurate delivery of munitions, the target-
marking and range-finding functions of lasers are expected to reduce collateral civilian
casualties. One critic of blinding laser weapons has stated that "[l]asers, as such, are not
the problem. They have made major contributions to making warfare more discriminate
and less destructive." William Arkin, Ban Tactical Laser Weapons, DEF. NEWS, July 17-23,
1995, at 20, 20. "Even peacekeeping operations, with their emphasis on multinational
involvement and minimizing collateral damage, now involve routine use of lasers." Hewish,
supra at 39.
18. ICRC BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 1, at 3.
19. Id.
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'dazzling', in which temporary blindness is caused, has attracted the
interest of some military planners it is impossible to develop a laser
which can only flash blind.
' 20
If these statements accurately reflect the ICRC's conclusions,
then eliminating "blinding as a method of warfare" may go far
beyond a ban on "intentional laser blinding." Any use of lasers to
temporarily impair enemy vision would have to be prohibited, and
any combat use of portable lasers that may foreseeably blind an
enemy permanently may be regarded as intentional, under the
maxim that a person intends all effects that naturally and reason-
ably follow from his or her acts.
At a minimum, "blinding as a method of warfare," which the
ICRC labels as "a superfluous injury and a cause of unnecessary
suffering ... prohibited under existing international humanitarian
law,",21 includes any deliberate use of lasers to affect the vision of
enemy combatant personnel. According to the ICRC, such
impermissible tactics may also include any use of laser weapons,
especially portable lasers, that would necessarily affect human sight
as a collateral effect.
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPERFLUOUS INJURY OR
UNNECESSARY SUFFERING
The ICRC claims that "blinding as a method of warfare"
violates existing international law. The "existing international
humanitarian law" to which the ICRC refers is found in Article
23(e) of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare
(Hague Regulations). These regulations provide that it is especially
forbidden "[t]o employ arms, projectiles, or materials of a nature
to cause superfluous injury,, 22 or "[tjo employ arms, projectiles or
material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering., 23 The phrases
"superfluous injury" and "unnecessary suffering" are alternative
English translations of the French phrase, "maux superfluous,"
20. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). Human Rights Watch gives prominence to the idea that
"many medical and military experts believe it is not possible to design a laser that can only
temporarily blind or dazzle." United States: U.S. Blinding Laser Weapons, HUM. RTS.
WATCH ARMS PROJECT (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), May 1995, at 6.
21. ICRC BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 1, at 7.
22. Convention with Respect to (II) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, art. 23(e), 32 Stat. 1803, 1817.
23. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
art. 23(e), 36 Stat. 2277, 2302.
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which both Hague Regulations use.24 The most recent codi-
fication of the law of war utilizes both English phrases, thus
prohibiting weapons, methods and means of warfare "of a nature
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."25
Several points should be noted about the principle of superflu-
ous injury or unnecessary suffering. First, the obligation not to use
weapons causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is now
undoubtedly part of customary international law, binding even
states that are not parties to either the 1899 or the 1907 Hague
Conventions on Land Warfare.26 The International Military
Tribunal at Nuremburg, for example, concluded that by 1939, the
Hague Regulations "were recognized by all civilized nations and
were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of
war," and were therefore binding even during wars in which non-
parties participated.27 More recently, the U.N. Secretary General,
in his report on the proposed statute of the International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia, concluded that the 1907 Hague Regulations
were among those parts of "conventional international humanitari-
an law which [have] beyond doubt become part of international
customary law."28 Article 3(a) of the Tribunal Statute, which the
Security Council accepted, includes the "employment of poisonous
weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering" as an offense that the Tribunal is competent to consid-
er.
29
Second, the principle prohibiting superfluous injury and
unnecessary suffering is intended to protect soldiers and other
24. See MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
195-96 (1982). Only the French text of the Hague Regulations is authentic. Id.
25. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June
8, 1977, art. 35, para. 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. 2, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
551, 574 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter Protocol I].
26. The Nuremberg Judgment (Intn'l Military Trib. 1945-1946), reprinted in 2 THE
LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 922, 961 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) [her-
einafter Nuremberg Judgment]. Cf. JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 551 (1954).
27. The Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 26.
28. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808 35, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163,
1170.
29. Id. at 1192.
1996]
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personnel taking a direct part in hostilities, rather than civilians or
other noncombatants. In the course of combat operations, it is, in
principle, legitimate to deliberately injure or kill persons taking a
direct part in hostilities. The rule against weapons causing
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury is a limit on means used
to accomplish this legitimate injury and killing.
Finally, the "principle does not prohibit weapons causing
extreme suffering or extensive injuries, but only those which cause
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injuries."3 It is not the high
level of suffering or degree of injury, considered in isolation, that
renders a weapon or method of warfare illegal under international
law. Rather, the principle considers the expected suffering or
injury in relation to the anticipated military advantages of the
weapon. The U.S. delegation to the 1974 Conference of Govern-
ment Experts on Weapons Which May Cause Unnecessary
Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects (1974 Lucerne Confer-
ence), expressed the principle as follows: "the 'necessity' of the
suffering must be judged in relation to the military utility of the
weapons."'"
It has been observed that "[t]he term 'unnecessary suffering'
implies that there is such a thing as 'necessary suffering,' "32 be-
cause "the infliction of some suffering and injury are an inherent
feature of armed conflict., 33  If the military advantages to be
gained from a weapon may only be achieved by inflicting a certain
level of suffering or injury on its victims, then the suffering is
necessary, the injury is not superfluous, and the weapon is lawful.
A distinguished U.S. commentator has summarized the law as
follows:
All war instruments are 'cruel' and 'inhuman' in the sense that
they cause destruction and human suffering. It is not, however,
the simple fact of destruction, nor even the amount thereof, that
is relevant in the appraisal of such instruments; it is rather the
30. C. Greenwood, Battlefield Laser Weapons in the Context of the Law on
Conventional Weapons, in BLINDING WEAPONS, REPORTS OF THE MEETINGS OF EXPERTS
CONVENED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMiTEE OF THE RED CROSS ON BATTLEFIELD
LASER WEAPONS 1989-1991, at 71, 73 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1993) [hereinafter
BLINDING WEAPONS EXPERTS REPORTS].
31. Resort to War and Armed Force, 1974 DIGEST §1, at 707.
32. Memorandum of Law from Hugh R. Overholt, Major General, Judge Advocate
General, U.S. Department of the Army, on the Use of Lasers as Antipersonnel Weapons,
para. 4(c) (Sept. 29, 1988).
33. Greenwood, supra note 30, at 73.
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needlessness, the superfluity of harm, the gross imbalance
between the military result and the incidental injury that is
commonly regarded as decisive of illegitimacy.' 4
A highly effective weapon will remain lawful even though it
inflicts a great deal of suffering on enemy troops. Humanitarians
may shrink from this conclusion, yet the unnecessary suffering
principle is not meaningless. The principle of unnecessary suffering
prohibits "gratuitous violence which serves no military end" and
"the infliction of suffering which serves no useful military pur-
pose., 35  As Sir David Hughes-Morgan of the United Kingdom
observed in his legal background paper delivered at the Lucerne
Conference:
[A] prohibition so framed is of value in forbidding the use of
any weapon which, while inflicting severe wounds, has no corre-
sponding military significance. The difficult cases, in which the
result of the proportionality equation are in dispute, can only be
resolved by the agreement of states to prohibit the use of
specific weapons.36
In practice, international law only forbids the use of weapons
that increase suffering without really increasing military advantage.
Where suffering must be carefully balanced against military utility,
new and specific limits must usually be negotiated to resolve the
issue. Once a weapon goes beyond unnecessary suffering and
superfluous injury, it has left the customary law of weapons use
and has entered the realm de lege ferenda, on the basis of a new
law.
A weapon's military utility includes factors beyond its power
to injure or kill. All factors must be taken into account when
deciding whether a weapon inflicts any unnecessary suffering. One
U.S. diplomat summarized the issue as follows:
The difficulty of coming to an objective conclusion [on legality
34. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 616 (1961); Cf U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AFP 110-31,
INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS
6-2 b(2) (1976) ("All weapons cause suffering. The critical factor in the prohibition against
unnecessary suffering is whether the suffering is needless or disproportionate to the military
advantages secured by the weapon, not the degree of suffering itself.").
35. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 34, at 616.
36. Kalshoven, supra note 4, at 260. While the Swedish delegate Hans Blix "agreed
with Sir David that proportionality was the applicable standard here he shrank back from
accepting the consequences of its application in all cases." Id.
1996] 713
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of a weapon] is compounded by the fact that "military effective-
ness" cannot be measured simply in terms of battlefield
casualties but must also take into account such factors as the
destruction or neutralization of military material, restriction of
movement, interdiction of lines of communication and effects on
morale, command and control, stamina and cohesion of opposing
forces, effectiveness against particular targets, availability of
alternate weapons, cost, and the security of the troops in-
volved.37
IV. CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
UNNECESSARY SUFFERING
A. Weapons Prohibited Under the Principle of Unnecessary
Suffering
An analysis of the scope and application of existing law on
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering involves an examination
of the weapons currently prohibited and the reasons for those
prohibitions. "What weapons or methods of warfare cause unneces-
sary suffering, and hence are unlawful per se, is best determined in
light of the practice of states., 38 State practice has condemned,
as per se unlawful, the use of poisoned weapons, barbed weapons,
expanding (dum-dum) bullets, glass and other nondetectable
fragments, and some uses of exploding or incendiary bullets.
1. Poisoned Weapons
The ban on poisoned weapons is one of the oldest continuing
prohibitions in the law of war, dating back to at least the late
Middle Ages. 39  Originally, chivalric ideals may have in part
motivated the ban on poisoned weapons; today, however, poisoning
is a classic illustration of a method of warfare that causes unneces-
sary suffering. A modern rifle bullet or shell fragment alone will
generally place a soldier out of action (hors de combat). Little' or
no additional military advantage would be gained by poisoning the
bullet or fragment. ° In most cases, the poison would only make
37. Resort to War and Armed Force, supra note 31, §1, at 708..
38. -U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 34, 6-2b(2). See also U.S. DEP'T OF
THE ARMY, ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 34b, at 18
(1956).
39. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAWS 44, 116
(1993); MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 104 (1955).
40. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 34.
[Vol. 18:705
Tactical Laser Weapons
the wound more difficult to treat, perhaps making death inevitable.
Thus, from a military point of view, poisoned weapons cause
suffering that is unnecessary or superfluous."
2. Barbed Weapons
Barbed bayonets or knives are prohibited for similar reasons.
A bayonet's thrust alone will usually place a combatant hors de
combat. Barbs, which tear the flesh as the bayonet is withdrawn,
would merely worsen the wound of a soldier who is already out of
action. This aggravation of an existing wound would be unneces-
sary and superfluous.
3. Small-Caliber Incendiary or Explosive Bullets
Small-caliber incendiary or explosive bullets were the first
weapons prohibited by multilateral treaties on the basis of what
later became known as the unnecessary suffering principle. The St.
Petersburg Declaration of 1868 (Petersburg Declaration) prohibited
the employment of "any projectile of a weight below 400 grams,
which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflamma-
ble substances. '4 2 The Petersburg Declaration based this prohibi-
tion on the following reasoning:
That the only legitimate objective which States should endeavor
to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy; That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the
greatest possible number of men; That this objective would be
exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate
the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevit-
able. ...
As in the case of poisoned weapons, a military rifle ball alone,
will almost certainly place a soldier hors de combat. Therefore, if
the bullet exploded or burned after impact, it would "uselessly
aggravate" 44 the wound and cause unnecessary suffering.
The Petersburg Declaration refers to disabling "the greatest
41. "From the time the bow and javelin became obsolete, no recorded instance appears
of the use of poisoned arms, projectiles, or bullets in war by modern armies. Obviously,
bullets kill and disable with or without smearing with poison." Id. at 619.
42. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grams Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra note 4, at 96.
43. Id.
44. Protocol I, supra note 25, at 552.
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possible number of men,"45 suggesting that the Declaration may
have been intended to apply only to anti-personnel use of explod-
ing or incendiary munitions. The circumstances leading to the
adoption of the Declaration lend support to this view. In 1863, the
Russian army first developed a rifle bullet that exploded on impact.
This weapon, however, worked only if it hit a hard surface and was
intended for use against ammunition wagons. Even if such a bullet
hit a soldier, no unnecessary suffering followed.
In 1867, the rifle bullet's original design was modified to
explode on impact with a soft target, such as the human body. It
was only at this point, when the-exploding bullet was no longer
merely an anti-material weapon, that the Czar's government
convened a conference in St. Petersburg to ban such ammuni-
tion.46
On the other hand, the Petersburg Declaration contains no
express exception for anti-material weapons, and the phrase "any
projectile"47 suggests that the prohibition was intended to be
sweeping. The legality of using small-caliber explosive or incendi-
ary bullets against ammunition wagons or other non-human targets
was therefore doubtful at best. In any event, the issue remained
moot for the remainder of the nineteenth century because no effort
was made to use such weapons.
With the development of military aviation in World War I,
the issue was no longer merely academic. Fighter airplanes'
machine guns were far more effective against enemy aircraft if
loaded with explosive or incendiary ammunition. When the
Petersburg Declaration was negotiated in 1868, "the prohibition of
small projectiles which are explosive or charged with fulminating
substances could not possibly have been intended to apply to air
warfare."'8
Nevertheless, Germany initially threatened to execute Allied
airmen as war criminals for using such munitions. No trials,
however, actually took place and the German air force eventually
adopted similar ammunition. By 1916, both the Allies and the
Central Powers were using explosive or incendiary munitions in air
45. Id.
46. Id. at 95.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW As APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 143 (1968).
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warfare without serious challenge from the other side.49 This use
continued in World War II and later conflicts. °
While the Petersburg Declaration remains a valid application
of the unnecessary suffering principle for anti-personnel weapons
in land warfare, small-caliber incendiary or explosive bullets are
generally regarded as lawful against targets requiring their use in
air warfare.5 ' Such munitions may painfully aggravate the wounds
of enemy air crew members, but this suffering is a military neces-
sity to achieve greater damage to, and higher destruction rates of,
enemy aircraft.52
There are other exceptions concerning the use of small-caliber
incendiary or explosive bullets. Because a combat aircraft in flight
cannot change its ammunition load, such aircrafts may use incendi-
ary or explosive bullets when strafing enemy ground troops.
Again, such munitions may cause greater suffering for the
wounded, but such suffering is necessary in light Of the realities of
air warfare.53
49. See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 34, at 621.
50. "The universal use of these bullets in the last war [i.e., World War III and the lack
of any protest strongly suggest their legitimization, and the desuetude of the prohibition,
at least in aerial war." Id.
51. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 34, at 6.
52. Compare 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 48, at 143.
Moreover, the intention of the Contracting Parties [to the St. Petersburg
Declaration] is clearly described as fixing the 'technical limits at which the
necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity' in such a
manner as to exclude merely disproportionate inhumanity. If the use of these
weapons is likely to lead to the disablement or destruction of an aeroplane, it is
arguable that such disproportion no longer exists.
(footnotes omitted) with BOTHE ET AL.. supra note 24, at 196-97
[W]eapons are designed and produced to be used to fulfill a variety of military
requirements other than merely disabling enemy combatants. Some examples of
such requirements include the destruction or neutralization of military movement,
the interdiction of military lines of communicatons, the weakening of the enemy's
war making resources and capabilities, and the enhancement of the security of
friendly forces. Thus, an artillery projectile or missile designed to destroy field
fortification or heavy material may be expected to cause injuries to personnel in
the vicinity of the target which would be more severe than necessary to render
these combatants hors de combat, but no authority has questioned the lawfulness
of such projectiles despite the gravity of their incidental effect on personnel.
53. Cf. Kalshoven, supra note 4, at 259 (quoting David Hughes-Morgan, Legal Criteria
for the Prohibition or Restriction of Use of Categories of Conventional Weapons (1974)).
[T]he requirements of the military task to be performed have to be taken into
account [in applying the unnecessary suffering principle]. For example, some of
the powerful weapons designed for use against armoured fighting vehicles are
likely to inflict severe injuries on their crews. But such weapons may be neces-
sary to penetrate the armoured protection on such vehicles and it is a legitimate
act of war to put fighting vehicles and their crews out of action. Similarly, a
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4. Dum-Dum Bullets
The next weapon to be prohibited in war was the "dum-dum"
bullet, named after a British arsenal near Calcutta. Because
ordinary rifle and pistol ammunition were not sufficient to stop the
impetuous charges of certain Afghan warriors, the dum-dum bullet
was developed to meet this threat. Dum-dum bullets have soft or
hollow points, which expand upon hitting the target. This effect
makes it less likely that the bullet will simply pass through the
target and ensures that the maximum kinetic energy is transferred
from the bullet to the target. Therefore, when used against a
charging foe, the dum-dum has greater stopping power than
ordinary hard-point ammunition.
The dum-dum, however, also produces a larger and more
severe wound than ordinary ammunition, thus making it vulnerable
to diplomatic attack as causing unnecessary suffering and superflu-
ous injury. Over British objections, the 1899 Hague Peace
Conference (Hague Conference), "inspired by the sentiments which
found expression in the Declaration of St. Petersburg," adopted the
Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets (Hague Declaration)
obligating its parties "to abstain from the use of bullets which
expand or flatten easily in the human body.
54
Louise Doswald-Beck of the ICRC has drawn some general
conclusions about the unnecessary suffering rule based on the ban
on dum-dum bullets. For example, the Petersburg Declaration's
reference to rendering death inevitable is not to be taken literally:
The prohibition of the use of expanding bullets ... would
appear to confirm the following: the rule is violated if death is
rendered likely, because dum-dum bullets in fact did not render
death 'inevitable,' and secondly, the rule is violated if excessive
suffering is caused in the majority of cases: the proponents of
these bullets argued that fhey were needed for certain human
particular level of penetration is required for small arms to defeat body armor or
steel helmets, and a weapon which did not do this would not be militarily
effective: its effect on an unprotected man, however, would be severe. Ideally,
a military commander should have available to him a range of weapons such as
to be able to meet exactly the degree of force needed in any particular situation.
For obvious reasons this is impossible: a soldier can carry only one rifle, for
example, and the varieties of artillery projectiles are necessarily limited.
Id.
54. Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29. 1899, reprinted in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 103.
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targets whom ordinary bullets did not stop, but this argument
was not accepted."
This last assertion, stating that a weapon is unlawful whenever
unnecessary suffering would foreseeably occur in a simple majority
of instances, is a more sweeping conclusion than the evidence
warrants. The military value of a weapon in specific circumstances
may be so great that it outweighs the fact that these circumstances
were not present when the weapon produced the majority of
casualties. Over the last eighty years, for example, war planes
using small-caliber incendiary and explosive munitions have caused
the vast majority of wounds during aerial strafing of ground forces,
not during air-to-air combat. Yet the military value of such
munitions in attacking other aircraft is so great that today no one
would question the legality of their use by fighter aircraft.
In fact, the circumstances surrounding Hague Declaration
negotiations suggest conclusions rather different than those of Ms.
Doswald-Beck. Historian Barbara Tuchman gives the following
account of events at the Hague Conference:
In the committee on limiting new weapons, the negative trend
had become somewhat embarrassing. Everyone was therefore
delighted to fall upon the question of dumdum, or expanding
bullets, which offered an opportunity both to outlaw something
and to vent the general anti-British feeling of the time. Devel-
oped by the British to stop the rush of fanatical tribesmen, the
bullets were vigorously defended by Sir John Ardagh against the
heated attack of all except the American military delegate,
Captain Crozier, whose country was about to make use of them
in the Philippines .... Unimpressed, the delegates voted 22-2,
against the unyielding opposition of Britain supported by the
United States, to prohibit the use of the dumdum bullet. 6
While Ms. Doswald-Beck reads too much significance into the
Hague Declaration, Ms. Tuchman, by attributing it largely to anti-
British prejudice, reads too little into it. In reality, the dum-dum
was a weapon of "small military importance."57 The "unyielding
opposition of Britain"" to banning the dum-dum actually yielded
55. L. Doswald-Beck, Lawfulness of the Anti-Personnel Use of Laser Weapons, in
BLINDING WEAPONS EXPERTS REPORTS, supra note 30, at 330, 331.
56. BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE PROUD TOWER: A PORTRAIT OF THE WORLD
BEFORE THE WAR, 1890-1914, at 261-62 (1966).
57. STONE, supra note 26, at 552.
58. TUCHMAN, supra note 56, at 262.
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less than ten years later when Great Britain acceded to the Hague
Declaration.59
In analyzing the Hague Declaration, it is significant that in an
age when European governments uniformly believed in the justice
of European colonialism, the other imperial powers at the Hague
Conference, including Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Russia and Turkey, all supported a ban on dum-dum bullets.
Although each of these powers had "fanatical barbarian[s]"'  of
their own, none of them saw the dum-dum as a particularly useful
weapon. Their lack of support for the dum-dum suggests that the
bullet was intended to solve a military problem that arose from the
particular warrior customs of only two native peoples, the Afghans
and the Filipino Moros. As a matter of legal drafting, however, the
Hague Conference could hardly have written an exception for
these groups by name, even in the age of imperialism. One of the
justifications of imperialism was that native morals and customs
would slowly improve under European tutelage. At some point,
the Afghans and the Moros would be entitled to the same
protection from dum-dums as other "civilized" peoples.
Further, the Hague Conference could not have practically
stated an exception addressing both British and U.S. concerns.
Phrases such as "fanatic tribesmen," "savage tribes" or similar
terms have no clear legal content and would be too vague. This
approach would also raise other problems, including the treatment
of native peoples serving in or with European military units.
The only practical options at the Hague Conference were
either to ban dum-dum bullets completely or to permit their use in
all conflicts, including those between Europeans, with the conse-
quent increase in the severity of wounds. Given these choices, the
59. Great Britain and Ireland acceded to the Hague Declaration on August 30, 1907.
See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICrs, supra note 4, at 104. The United States expressed
the following position on the Declaration:
The United States is not a party to the agreement prohibiting the use of
expanding bullets, or "dum-dums", signed at The Hague, July 29, 1899. In that
Agreement, the parties agreed "to abstain from the use of bullets which expand
or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which
does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions." The United States
has, however, acknowledged that it will abide by the terms of the agreement
prohibiting expanding bullets.
Resort to War and Armed Force, supra note 31, §1, at 706.
60. TUCHMAN supra note 56, at 262.
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Hague Conference chose to ban the dum-dum.6 t
This ban was not based on an assessment that dum-dums
would cause "excessive suffering . . . in the majority of cases."
Rather, it involved balancing the additional suffering, which would
result from use of expanding bullets in all wars, against their
military value in two specific, localized situations. The dispropor-
tion between increased suffering and military value was so great
that the anticipated suffering appeared unnecessary to twenty-two
of the twenty-four delegations at the Hague Conference.
5. Glass and Other Nondetectable Fragments
Weapons using fragments not detectable by X-rays are the
most recent weapons to be formally outlawed on grounds of
unnecessary suffering. Protocol I to the 1981 U.N. Convention on
Prohibitions of Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) provides: "[i]t is prohibited
to use any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by
fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-
rays.1
62
Before the CCW, customary international law had already
prohibited weapons using clear glass fragments as a means of
injury.63 Glass fragments are difficult for a surgeon to see and
remove from a wound. By the time a wounded soldier sees a
surgeon, he is hors de combat. It is therefore militarily unnecessary
to use a weapon that makes the wound harder to treat.
Similar reasoning led to the ban on fragments not detectable
by X-rays. "The prohibition is an expression of the principle that
the purpose of a weapon should not be to hinder the healing of
wounds it causes, and this principle is certainly one of the basic
61. By its terms, the Hague Declaration was "only binding for the Contracting Powers
in the case of a war between two or more of them." Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning
Expanding Bullets, supra note 54, at 103. Because Afghanistan never acceded to the
Declaration and the United States never became party to it, both Great Britain and the
United States could have continued to use dum-dum bullets against their enemies.
Ignoring the Hague Declaration, however, could have incurred domestic and international
political embarrassment, leading both powers to abandon the dum-dum for all purposes.
This abandonment suggests that the dum-dum really had small military value. The U.S.
Army later developed the .45 caliber automatic pistol, which achieved great stopping power
by using a heavy and slow bullet, to replace the dum-dum.
62. CCW, supra note 13, Protocol I, at 1529.
63. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 34, 6-2b(2).
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elements for determining whether a weapon produces 'unnecessary
suffering.' ,,64
B. Conclusions Based on Application of the Principle
The following broad conclusions may be drawn from state
application of the rule against weapons causing unnecessary
suffering or superfluous injury:
(1) An otherwise effective weapon becomes unlawful
when it is deliberately altered for the purpose of increasing the
suffering it inflicts. Examples include poisoned bullets and
barbed bayonets.
(2) A new weapon or method of warfare may inflict
unnecessary suffering if its military advantages are marginal,
temporary or otherwise vastly disproportionate to the antici-
pated increase in suffering. The dum-dum bullet is an
example.
(3) -The legality of a weapon may change depending on
technological and military developments. Small-caliber explo-
sives or incendiary ammunition in air warfare are examples of
weapons whose status change according to technological
developments.
(4) A weapon may not be deliberately selected for the
suffering that it inflicts when other, equally effective means are
readily available. Examples include projectiles filled with glass
or non-detectable fragments.
In considering the last conclusion, the phrase "readily
available" should be emphasized. As is frequently observed, the
soldier is not and cannot be required to carry a golf bag into battle
with specific weapons and types of ammunition to be used only in
specific circumstances. Availability of alternate weapons is
properly taken into account in assessing the legality of weapons. 65
V. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPERFLUOUS -INJURY
OR UNNECESSARY SUFFERING TO TACTICAL LASER WEAPONS
Application of the unnecessary suffering rule, as construed
64. Yves Sandoz, A New Step Forward in International Law: Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS,
Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 3, 11.
65. See, e.g., Resort to War and Armed Force, supra note 31, §1, at 708; U.S. DEP'T
OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 34, 6-6c.
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through state practice, to tactical laser weapons, requires identifi-
cation of the specific weapons involved as well as their potential
military uses. As noted above, the ICRC concept of "blinding as
a method of warfare, 66 appears to include any deliberate use of
lasers to affect the vision of enemy combatant personnel and any
use of laser weapons, especially portable lasers, that would
necessarily affect human sight.
Three actual or proposed types of lasers appear to fall within
this category of "blinding as a method of warfare": anti-aircraft
lasers, portable anti-optical weapons, and laser rifles designed to
blind the naked eye.
A. Anti-Aircraft Lasers
The speed and accuracy of laser beams would appear to make
lasers an ideal weapon to "dazzle" or flash-blind pilots in low-level
air attacks. In a U.S. military simulation test, all the aircraft
attacking a laser-defended position were "lost" in the attack run.
In a second run, even after a change of tactics, two of ten attack
aircraft were lost.67 A twenty percent enemy loss rate is very high
for an anti-aircraft system,68 and further aircrew training would
probably bring down this figure. Nevertheless, this test suggests
the militarily effectiveness of an anti-air laser weapon.
The British Royal Navy reportedly deployed one such weapon.
"The system, known as a 'Laser Dazzle Sight' (LDS) is primarily
intended to make the pilot abandon his attack, but the system can
inflict serious eye damage and even blindness., 69 It is not known
how often in actual combat a pilot will suffer serious long-term or
permanent eye damage. For the sake of legal analysis, a very high
rate of serious injury of fifty percent will be assumed.
In the cases where a pilot is flash-blinded and breaks off the
attack as a result, a significant military advantage accrues to the
defended, particularly in naval warfare. A single fighter aircraft
66. ICRC BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 1, at 2.
67. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 55, at 333.
68. For example, in World War II, the U.S. Army Air Force (AAF) suffered a 19%
loss rate in its August 17, 1943 raids on Schweinfurt and Regensburg, Germany. The AAF
regarded these losses as intolerable, leading to major changes in tactics and equipment.
See, ROBIN HIGHAM, AIR POWER, A CONCISE HISTORY 134 (1972).
69. Fermin Gallego & Mark Daly, Laser Weapon in Royal Navy Service, JANE'S DEF.
WKLY Jan 13, 1990, reprinted in BLINDING WEAPONS EXPERTS REPORTS, supra note 30,
at 170.
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may carry missiles that will sink a frigate, destroyer or other small
warship and may seriously damage even the largest vessels. In land
warfare, forcing the enemy to break off an air to ground attack is
militarily important, though probably not as significant in naval
warfare. Because the effect on the pilot is only temporary, no
question of unnecessary suffering arises.
Flash-blinding for more than ten seconds will cause a pilot to
either crash or bail Out.7° In cases of more serious eye damage,
the attacking pilot will most likely be unable to return to base, and
the aircraft will be lost. Historically, destruction of enemy war-
planes has been regarded as having great military value. For
instance, in World War I and World War II, the destruction of
enemy aircraft was regarded as so important that state practice, in
effect, reversed the long-standing ban on small-caliber exploding or
incendiary bullets. Today, when a single fighter plane's weapons
load exceeds that of a World War II heavy bomber, the destruction
of enemy aircraft has even greater military value.
It is difficult to support the position that the psychological
suffering caused by long-term blindness, which the ICRC campaign
brochure quoted at the beginning of this Article stresses, will often
be as or even more severe than that accompanying the disfigure-
ment caused by air-delivered small caliber explosive and incendiary
munitions.
Assessing anti-aircraft lasers against the general criteria of
unnecessary suffering established by state practice leads to the
following conclusions:
(1) There is no evidence that such lasers have been
deliberately altered in order to increase the blindness or other
suffering they inflict. The ICRC's assertion that it is impossi-
ble to build a laser that only flash-blinds suggests that blind-
ness in a certain, undetermined number of situations is an
inherent danger and not the product of deliberate design.
(2) The anticipated military advantages, including protec-
tion of warships and more certain destruction of enemy
aircraft, are significant rather than marginal, temporary or
vastly disproportionate to the anticipated increase in suffering,
70. "If a pilot is flash-blinded for between ten and thirty seconds during the final phase
of an attack, he will most certainly have to leave the aircraft or crash." Bengt Anderberg
& Myron L. Wolbarsht, Blinding Lasers: The Nastiest Weapon?, Military Tech., Mar. 1990,
reprinted in BLINDING WEAPONS EXPERTS REPORTS, supra note 30, at 161, 162.
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which may include permanent eye damage in a significant
number of cases.
(3) These conclusions may change if it becomes technically
possible to build a laser that will do no more than flash-blind.
(4) Other equally effective air defenses should not
preclude deployment of anti-air lasers based on the suffering
that they inflict. The anti-air laser would have both advantag-
es and disadvantages that other anti-aircraft systems do not.
Warships carry a variety of anti-aircraft systems, rapid fire
guns, radar-guided and heat-seeking missiles to meet a variety
of threats from the air. Each system has its own strengths and
weaknesses, and the anti-air laser would be a valuable addition
to such a defensive mix.
Based on the high military value accorded to destroying enemy
military aircraft, the rule against unnecessary suffering does not
prohibit the use of Jlasers as anti-aircraft weapons, even if it is
assumed that a high percentage of surviving pilots would incur
long-term or permanent eye damage. Such injuries are not
superfluous to attaining the legitimate end of destruction of enemy
military aircraft.
B. Portable Anti-Optical Lasers
A second type of system that involves blinding as a method of
warfare is a portable anti-optical laser. These lasers are land
warfare weapons intendedto find, using a low-power laser beam,
and neutralize, using a higher-power beam, enemy optical and
electro-optical sights. They burn out an electro-optical sight system
as follows:
In a typical engagement, the gunner searches the battlefield
using his sight. A suitable target appears as a reflective cat's eye
in his field of view. He then fires the weapon, which emits laser
pulses that are effective out to ranges beyond 2km. A rifleman's
inherent unsteadiness aids the destructive effect, as the resultant
dispersion assists in burning out larger numbers of detector
elements in an electro-optical sensor.7'
These lasers also find and damage simple, non-electric, optical
devices, such as telescopic sights, binoculars and tank periscopes.
When damaging non-electric instruments, these lasers also injure
71. Hewish, supra note 17, at 39.
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the eye of anyone using the optical device at the time. During the
1995 CCW Review Conference, the Netherlands delegation
classified anti-optics lasers as "anti-materiel [sic] lasers" that also
had an "anti-personnel component., 72 Critics charge that because
of these systems, "human eyes would always be targets,, 73 because
the user cannot distinguish electro-optical targets from simple
optical targets.
The military utility of these systems would be greatest when
they are used in an anti-tank role. The crews of tanks and other
armored fighting vehicles must use optical and electro-optical
systems during combat. If an anti-optical laser temporarily slows
or halts a hostile armored vehicle, friendly anti-armor weapons
would have time to aim and fire, thereby destroying the vehicle.
Like the destruction of an enemy warplane, destruction of an
armored fighting vehicle must be given high military value. While
anti-optics lasers would not directly destroy such vehicles, they
would make an important contribution to this result.
Current state practice recognizes that a high level of suffering
such as wounding and death by molten metal fragments or
asphyxiation, may legitimately be imposed on an entire tank crew
in order to render the vehicle inoperative. As Sir David Hughes-
Morgan observed during the 1974 Lucerne Conference:
[S]ome of the powerful weapons designed for use against
armored fighting vehicles are likely to inflict severe injuries on
their crews. But such weapons may be necessary to penetrate
the armored protection on such vehicles and it is a legitimate act
of war to put fighting vehicles and their crews out of action.74
Anti-optical lasers may be used to make anti-armor weapons
more effective. Judging the overall injury and suffering necessarily
imposed on soldiers in modern armored warfare, the additional
injury of one crew member's eye does not seem excessive or
disproportionate to the anticipated military advantages. The
primary target would be the vehicle, not the sight of individual
crew members.
Another valuable military use of anti-optical lasers would
72. U.N. Information Service, Review Conference of States Parties to Conventional
weapons Convention, Vienna, 25 September-13 October, Adopts Ban on Use, Transfer of
Blinding Laser weapons, Press Release DC/2535 (Oct. 17, 1995).
73. Arkin, supra note 17, at 20.
74. Kalshoven, supra note 4, at 259.
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probably be as an anti-sniper weapon. By killing officers and other
key personnel and forcing soldiers to take cover at unexpected
times, snipers may have an adverse impact on enemy forces far out
of proportion to their numbers. Anti-optical lasers would detect
the lens of the sniper's sight and then destroy it, while also injuring
the sniper's eye, perhaps seriously and permanently.
Injuring a sniper's sighting eye is the most discriminating and
certain way to place such a specialist soldier hors de combat with
minimal physical injury. More than any other organ, the sniper's
sighting eye threatens harm to the enemy. A sniper may continue
to fight effectively with wounds elsewhere in his body, but an
injury to the eye will certainly and immediately remove him as a
threat without unnecessary injury.
From a military standpoint, the most questionable use of anti-
optical lasers would be to randomly detect and then attack
binoculars or other optical devices in use on the enemy's lines.
Because private soldiers are rarely issued binoculars in any army,
this use is far more likely to injure an officer or a specialist, such
as a tank gunner, a forward air controller or an artillery observer.
Air controllers and artillery spotters are somewhat similar to
snipers because their eyes are their primary weapons. Both may
function effectively with other wounds, but an eye injury will place
them hors de combat with a minimum of unnecessary injury.
Even if anti-optical lasers produce blindness or permanent
injury in a high percentage of cases, these injuries will not be
militarily unnecessary or superfluous in most instances. Anti-
optical lasers are likely to be useful against armored vehicles,
snipers, artillery observers, air controllers and enemy leaders, and
thus, are unlike dum-dum bullets.
Assessing portable anti-optical lasers against the four general
criteria of unnecessary suffering leads to the follbwing conclusions:
(1) These weapons have not been altered to enhance their
blinding power against the human eye. The possibility of eye
injury depends more on the target's characteristics (simple
optical or electro-optical) rather than the traits of the laser.
(2) In an anti-armor or anti-sniper role, the military utility
of the portable anti-optical laser is not marginal, temporary or
disproportionate to any increase in suffering. Armored
vehicles and snipers are high-value targets in modem war.
Even in the case of general battlefield use, the anti-optical
laser has an inherent bias towards selecting targets of higher
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military value, including officers, artillery spotters and forward
air controllers.
(3) These conclusions may change depending on develop-
ments in laser technology, particularly if it becomes possible
to damage simple optical instruments with less danger to the
eye.
(4) An anti-optical laser would often be the best weapon
to render specialist troops, who are most likely to be issued
optical equipment, hors de combat without causing unneces-
sary suffering. Snipers, artillery observers and forward air
controllers pose a primary threat, which is closely linked to
accurate vision. Damaging their eyes is the most effective and
discriminate way of eliminating that threat. If it were possible
to choose between wounding a sniper or an artillery observer
in the leg or in the eye, a good argument could be made that
a leg wound is more likely to produce unnecessary suffering
because it may not place him hors de combat but instead, may
leave him in a position to be injured again or killed.
C. Laser Rifles Designed to Blind the Naked Eye
The most questionable weapons are laser rifles designed to
blind the naked eye, or lasers attached to rifles for a similar
purpose. No such weapons are known to exist, except possibly a
Chinese system that is being advertised as a blinding weapon.75
Both the practicality and military utility of these weapons are
speculative. At the 1991 ICRC Roundtable of Experts on laser
weapons, several military experts were skeptical that such weapons
would ever be generally used in combat.76
Some participants questioned whether such a development was
in fact likely to occur. One said he would find it difficult to
justify such a procurement. The incorporation of this device with
the rifle would increase the cost of each rifle and bring with it
a longer support tail. Further, it would make the rifle heavier,
involve additional training for soldiers and complicate the
operational and support aspects. Therefore, although such
devices might be used in limited numbers, he could not foresee
them being issued to all infantrymen. Another participant
75. See Peter Felstead, China Markets Blinding Laser, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV.,
June 1995, at 1, 1.
76. Doswald-Beck, supra note 55, at 333.
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supported these objections .... Further, although a laser may
be more accurate than a bullet there remained the additional
difficulty of hitting a small portion of a running and bobbing
enemy and lasers fired at the back of retreating combatants
would be totally ineffective. Lasers would therefore have to be
used in combination with rifles which would increase logistic
problems by requiring batteries as well as ammunition.77
The ICRC claims that "if lasers were used intentionally to
inflict blindness, so that blinding as a method of warfare became
common practice, serious eye damage might account for between
25 and 50 percent of all casualties." This estimate contradicts a
century of military history. In modern war, indirect-fire weapons,
bombs and mines inflict most casualties. Directly-aimed rifle fire
produces only a fraction of casualties. For example, the ICRC's
own experience in treating 12,958 Afghan refugees for war wounds
found that only 2975 (23%) had suffered bullet wounds. Indirect
fire fragmentation weapons and mines accounted for almost three-
fourths of the injuries. 78 It is very difficult to believe that the
introduction of laser weapons would significantly increase the
number of casualties from directly-aimed fire.
From a legal standpoint, a more modest projection of the
combat role of laser rifles cuts both ways. On the one hand, fewer
casualties will mean potentially less unnecessary suffering or
superfluous injury. On the other hand, as the military role of
blinding laser rifles decreases in significance, there is less basis for
arguing that military utility .justifies the suffering that is caused.
Special operations, rather than general combat, would appear
to be the arena in which a blinding laser rifle would most likely be
useful. For example, in a raid to capture a specific enemy figure
for interrogation, blinding the target may ease his or her capture.
A blinding laser rifle may be useful from a humanitarian stand-
point in dealing with hostage situations, where enemy forces are
using civilians as a shield. Blinding some or all of the enemy forces
may, in some circumstances, permit the hostages to escape. In
neither of these scenarios does a blinding laser appear essential.
If the psychological effects of blinding are as bad as the ICRC
suggests, blinding laser rifles may be considered useful as a "terror"
weapon. In principle, it is permissible to spread terror among
77. Id.
78. BLINDING WEAPONS EXPERTS REPORTS, supra note 30, at 181.
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enemy combatant personnel, but not civilians.
Blinding has occasionally been used to spread terror in
warfare, most notoriously by the Byzantine Emperor Basil II who,
in A.D. 1014, reportedly blinded 14,000 Bulgarian prisoners of war
and then released them. The Bulgarian tsar is said to have col-
lapsed and died when he saw his blind army.
79
The military effects of blinding are difficult to predict. Acts
designed to demoralize an enemy often simply increase his hatred
and determination to resist. Terror induced by the frightfulness of
wounds has never been considered a military benefit in assessing
the legitimacy of weapons, and this approach should continue.
Louise Doswald-Beck correctly concludes that "the terror value of
a certain weapon is not a factor that can validly be taken into
account when making an assessment of the military utility of a
weapon ....
The blinding laser rifle resembles the dum-dum bullet because
its military value appears marginal at best. Even if such weapons
needlessly blind only a few combatants, it will be difficult to argue
that their suffering was militarily necessary.8"
It is significant that; in 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense
unilaterally renounced this type of weapon, a laser designed to
cause permanent blindness to the unaided eye 82 and that Protocol
79. See ROMILLY JENKINS, BYZANTIUM, THE IMPERIAL CENTURIES, A.D. 610-1071,
at 326-27 (1969).
80. Doswald-Beck, supra note 55, at 331.
81. The concept of suffering includes psychological as well as physical injury.
Greenwood, supra note 22, at 75. The ICRC campaign brochure emphasizes this point.
See, ICRC BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 1, at 4-6. The post-war social effects of a
weapon's use, however, are not to be considered when assessing whether it causes
unnecessary suffering.
The social consequences of an injury, in the sense of the effects upon the victim's
society of having to cope with people who have suffered a particular type of
injury such as blinding, however, seems to fall outside the concept of injury in the
existing law. Such effects are difficult to assess and are likely to vary greatly from
one society to the next. There is no evidence that this factor was taken into
account in the past development of the law of weaponry.
Greenwood, supra note 30, at 76. Thus, the social and economic costs of rehabilitating and
caring for blind veterans, see ICRC BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 1, at 6, while certainly
pertinent to the policy question of whether new prohibitions should be negotiated, are not
relevant to the legality of binding weapons under existing international law.
82. "The Department of Defense prohibits the use of lasers specifically designed to
cause permanent blindness of unenhanced vision and supports negotiations prohibiting the
use of such weapons." Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), U.S.
Department of Defense, News Release No. 482-95, DOD Announces Policy on Blinding
Lasers (Sept. 1, 1995).
Tactical Laser Weapons
IV to the CCW will subsequently ban it. The 1995 CCW Review
Conference appears to have struck the right balance on the.issue
of tactical laser weapons. A good argument may be made that
such weapons, if they are ever created and deployed, would violate
the unnecessary suffering principle in addition to the provisions of
CCW Protocol IV.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ICRC, in contrast to the CCW Review Conference, has
only created confusion in this area of international law. By
declaring the undefined concept of "blinding as a method of
warfare" unlawful and making exaggerated claims for the destruc-
tiveness of lasers, the ICRC has helped to lay the basis for false
war crime charges against any soldier captured with a portable
laser. The ICRC may have compromised its own ability to prevent
abuse of prisoners of war subjected to such charges.
For similar reasons, caution should be exercised in response to
Ann Peters' call to apply "the spirit behind the prohibitions" in
Protocol IV to the CCW.s3 Protocol IV, like any treaty, should
instead be applied in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary
meaning of its terms.' In addition, other rules of international
law should be taken into account in treaty interpretation." Such
rules include the customary rule that violations of the law of war
give rise to individual penal responsibility as war crimes. 86  As
part of the law of war, Protocol IV is penal legislation and should
be carefully construed to give reasonable notice of the exact
prohibited behavior. Improper application may result in unfair war
crimes prosecution of prisoners of war captured with legitimate
target-marking or range-finding lasers.
Assessing the legality of weapons under the rule against
unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury requires a balancing
of military utility against anticipated injuries. Human rights
organizations, including the ICRC, are singularly ill-equipped to
assess the military aspect of this equation: This is well illustrated
by Dr. Robin Coupland, the ICRC surgeon cited by Ms. Peters as
83. Peters, supra note 34.
84. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
art. 31, para. 1, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92.
85. See id. art. 31, para. 3, at 692.
86. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 34, at 15-3.
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having "drawn up a list of health effects by which any weapon
system could be objectively judged to inflict superfluous injury and
unnecessary suffering. 8 7 None of the cited criteria relate to the
military value of the weapons system. As demonstrated earlier,
such an approach finds no support in state practice or other
accepted sources of international law.
Human rights organizations make their most valuable
contribution to the debate over legality of specific weapons by
gathering data and publicizing the non-military effects of weapons.
These organizations should beware of clairming the authority to
declare specific weapons to be in violation of existing international
law. In the end, such declarations may do more harm than good.'
87. Peters, supra note 34. As to the feasibility of establishing "objective" medical
standards for suffering in war, see R. Scott, Unnecessary Suffering?-A Medical View, in
ARMED CONFLIcr AND THE NEW LAW, supra note 4, at 272, 277.
During the conference at Lucerne in 1974 a number of physicians met together
to discuss the concept of 'suffering' and to consider whether it could be defined
or quantified in some scientific way. They agreed that it could not whereas 'injury'
probably could.... However the legal experts agreed that 'suffering' was a valid
concept, even if the physicians found it difficult to quantify.
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